Samaras  v. Samaras, No. 1  CA-CV 25-0611 PB (App. Div. I, July 29, 2026) (J. Foster) https://coa1.azcourts.gov/Portals/1/OpinionFiles/Div1/2026/Samaras%20v.%20Samaras%20-%20Final%20for%20posting.pdf?ver=OSm-L4zL9ca1A--nE2KNuA%3D%3D

IN DETERMINING TESTAMENTARY CAPACITY TO EXECUTE A WILL COURT MUST CONSIDER ALL EVIDENCE THAT MIGHT BEAR ON WHETHER DECEDENT WAS OF SOUND MIND AT THE MOMENT THE WILL WAS EXECUTED, EVEN IF SOME OF THAT EVIDENCE RELATES TO DECEDENT'S SOUNDNESS OF MIND AT AN EARLIER DATE

In 2017 decedent executed a living trust designating his son and daughter equal beneficiaries along with a pour-over will designating daughter as personal representative and transferred the residue to the trust upon his death. In 2018 decedent executed a new will again designating his daughter as personal representative and leaving all his estate to daughter. Son then brought this action seeking a Petition for Formal Probate and Appointment of Personal Representative claiming his decedent father lacked testamentary capacity to execute the second will.

The Maricopa County Superior court held a hearing and took testimony from multiple witnesses ultimately concluding the son failed to prove the decedent was of unsound mind when the second will was executed by a preponderance of the evidence. The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

A valid will must be executed by “a person who is eighteen

years of age or older and who is of sound mind.” A.R.S. § 14-2501. Courts

refer to the “sound mind” requirement as “testamentary capacity.” See

Matter of Estate of Killen, 188 Ariz. 562, 566 (App. 1996) (equating “mental

capacity” to execute a will with “testamentary capacity”). The law

presumes that a person executing a will had sufficient mental capacity at

the time of execution and the person did so “free from undue influence and

duress,” but that presumption is rebuttable. A.R.S. § 14-2712(B) (addressing

“governing instruments”); see also A.R.S. § 14-1201(28) (defining

“governing instrument” to include wills and trusts). And the “law favors

testacy” or the leaving of a will. Killen, 188 Ariz. at 565.

Here the trial court ruled that the daughter's witnesses on testamentary capacity were “unreliable and not credible” yet found against the son on the basis his evidence was “too remote” though more credible.  The court limited its consideration of the evidence to only the moment that the 2018 will was executed. While the trial court “must focus on the moment a will is signed, this focus is not so narrow as to exclude other relevant evidence” to the extent that evidence bears upon decedent's mental condition at the time of the execution of the second will. “Here, the superior court acknowledged [decedent's] disposition and cognitive abilities were declining but disregarded that information because it was not evidence of capacity “at the time of the execution of the 2018 Will. The law does not require such a narrow view.”

The trial court must reconsider its ruling in light of the “totality of the circumstances .  .  . only in so far as it tends to show mental condition at the time of the execution of the will.”