Aldasoro v. Pavlinch, No. 1 CA-CV 25-0533 (App. Div. I, September 24, 2026) (J. Becke) https://coa1.azcourts.gov/Portals/1/OpinionFiles/Div1/2026/CV25-0533%20-%20Aldasoro%20OP%20Final.pdf?ver=wTnYZhcRMAxqj17SSQMqJQ%3D%3D

POLICE OFFICERS ENJOY NO COMMON LAW QUALIFIED IMMUNITY FROM NEGLIGENCE CLAIMS/ A.R.S. § 28-624 DOES NOT GRANT POLICE OFFICERS STATUTORY IMMUNITY BUT RATHER SETS FORTH A STANDARD OF DUE CARE

Defendant police officer while responding to an emergency call in a marked City of Phoenix police car ran a red light with his emergency lights flashing. Whether or not he had his siren on is in dispute. He crashed into plaintiff's vehicle in the intersection. Plaintiff was injured and sued alleging simple negligence. The Maricopa County Superior Court granted defendant summary judgement finding the defendant police officer was exercising discretion while responding to an emergency and therefore had qualified common law immunity from suit.  The Arizona Court of Appeals reversed and remanded.

“Governmental tort liability is the rule and immunity is the exception .  .  . there is no common law immunity for police officers in negligence actions” regardless of whether the conduct in question is discretionary or ministerial. 

Significantly, the court rejected the holdings in Spooner v. City of Phoenix, 246 Ariz. 119 (App. 2018) Jennings v. Agne, 254 Ariz. 174 (App. 2022) both of which recognized qualified common law immunity for police officers exercising discretionary versus ministerial functions.

[Defendant police officer] and the City argue they have common law qualified

immunity for [plaintiff's]negligence claim, relying primarily on Spooner

and Jennings. Recognizing that we are not bound by those cases, and

because we are convinced that both Jennings and Spooner are based on

“clearly erroneous principles,” we do not follow them here. See Castillo v.

Indus. Comm'n, 21 Ariz. App. 465, 471 (1974). Instead, we recognize and

apply the common law set forth in various cases decided before Spooner and

Jennings, which leads inexorably to the conclusion that [the defendant officer]and the

City are not absolved from liability for simple negligence based on common

law qualified immunity.

Further, A.R.S. § 28-624—which permits the driver of an emergency response vehicle to violate certain motor vehicle laws when an audible signal like a siren is activated, does not create immunity for police officers. Rather, it creates a “privilege” to police officers, otherwise required to exercise reasonable care even when complying with the statute. 

To be clear, this privilege can impact whether the driver of an

emergency vehicle is liable for causing an accident, but not because it

renders the driver immune from suit. Rather, the privilege means that a

driver operating an emergency vehicle with lights and sirens who, for

instance, runs a red light resulting in an accident is not negligent per se.

In fact, the statute itself provides, “This section does not relieve the driver of an authorized emergency vehicle from the duty to drive with due regard for the safety of all persons and does not protect the driver from the consequences of the driver's reckless disregard for the safety of others.”